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Kelsen -  Hart -  Dworkin 
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O ne of the main challenges of contemporary philosophy of law is to solve the problem of form, that is to say, of consistency, of completeness, of 
»wholeness« of law. From the point of view of predominantly positivist legal 
theory, the problem of wholeness of law could be: how to achieve a unified 
legal system, and in what way is it to be guaranteed? Leaving aside the 
question why the law is supposed to be whole at all, why is it necessary to 
conceive the law as a unified system, we should, nevertheless, point out that 
this presupposition has never been put into question by contemporary legal 
philosophy. A full account of this problem is yet to be given, though not in the 
present paper, since it could not be integrated within its general framework. In 
this context, we could suggest only the general idea of the possible answer to 
this question, that the universally accepted presupposition of wholeness of law 
is a part of the problem, not the method of its solution.
The aim of this paper is to suggest why the interpretation of law, by taking as 
its basis the very presupposition of the wholeness of law, also could be 
understood as a rejection of the challenge of postmodernism. For our present 
purpose, postmodernist enterprise in theory and practice could be 
characterized as an attempt to demonstrate how truth, consensus, unity and 
sameness are produced by marginalization, exclusion and suppression of 
differences. In the case of the institution of law as a practice of social 
regulation, the postmodernist project is preoccupied, generally speaking, with 
the denouncement of the totalitarian feature of the universalizing pretensions 
of legal discourse and, more specifically, with the paradoxical relation between 
finding the truth or, rather, the »right« interpretation, and the exercise of 
power.
For our present purpose, it is not necessary to analyse in detail how each of the 
three legal philosophers mentioned in the title tackled this problem. What is 
important, however, is to show in what way the answers given to this question 
by Kelsen, Hart and Dworkin focus on the role of the judge in exercising legal 
power. Our starting hypothesis is that the judge or, rather, the exercising of 
judicial power, may well be understood as the point at which the whole 
interpretation of law as a unified system breaks down.
*
The solution proposed by Kelsen in his first major work, Reine Rechtslehre, is 
a hierarchical system of legal norms with a fundamental norm (Grundnorm) as
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its basis. But in his later work, a legal system is conceived as a set of individual 
judicial decisions, »linked together,« as B. S. Jackson puts it, »only by the fact 
that they belong to a common system of authorisation.«1 Regardless of 
important differences between Pure Theory o f  Law  and Kelsen’s later doctrine 
of norms, for Kelsen, the wholeness of law is not at issue. According to 
Kelsen, a system of norms belongs to the legal universe if and only if the 
condition of normative consistency is fulfilled. In other words, a legal system is 
experienced as unified and taken for granted as such from the very start.
For Hart, the law is to be conceived as the union of primary and secondary 
rules, where primary rules are rules to guide the behaviour of individuals, 
while secondary rules are rules about primary rules, of how they are to be 
created and recognized. The rule of recognition is a means by which an 
appropriate authority provides an »identity card« indicating that a rule in 
question belongs to a legal system and has, therefore, legal validity. In short, 
the law is that which is declared as such by the »rule of recognition.« This 
fundamental rule, which in many ways functions analogously to Kelsen’s 
Grundnorm, is based on universal acceptance by a given community or, at 
least, by officials exercising judicial power.
For Kelsen as well as for Hart, declaring themselves legal positivists, the law is 
a system of rules unified by an exceptional rule. Because of its exceptional 
position, this rule -  Grundnorm for Kelsen or the rule of recognition for Hart
-  could be called a master rule. It is nothing but a pure signifier, giving unity 
and identity to an assemblage of unrelated rules or, rather, totalizing a field of 
dispersed rules into a discrete, hierarchical legal system.
From the point of view of legal positivism, every legal system has an ultimate 
norm or rule, a rule of recognition, or the Grundnorm, which is the basis of all 
legal norms/rules. This fundamental rule/norm defines the ultimate criteria of 
validity for all rules/norms of the system. At the same time, it defines those 
practical considerations and principles that are relevant and legally binding 
grounds for judicial decision-making. This fundamental rule/norm, being 
ultimate, cannot itself be valid, at least not in the sense in which other legal 
rules are valid, because it does not rest on some further standard of validity (a 
more fundamental rule/norm), but simply on its universal acceptance. It is the 
sole rule in a legal system of rules whose validity or, rather, binding force 
depends upon its acceptance. It is noteworthy that accepting a positivist 
conception of law leads almost automatically to the conclusion, drawn also by 
Kelsen and Hart, that what could not be subsumed under a hierarchical system 
of rules falls out of law or, strictly speaking, is not law.
For legal positivists as Kelsen and Hart, the legal system is distinguished from 
other normative systems by the fact that the validity of legal norms/rules is
1. B.S. Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and New York 
1985, p. 234.
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determined by their recognition by certain authoritative institutions, namely 
the courts, which are charged with interpretation and application of the 
norms/rules of the system. On the other hand, legal norms are conceived not 
only as standards guiding human behaviour, but also as standards and criteria 
defining judicial duties and guiding judicial decisions. For every legal system to 
function, at least from the point of view of legal positivism, there must be a 
shared context of interpretation of rules in which legislator (law-maker), judge 
(law-applier), and ordinary law-follower participate.
To establish this shared context of interpretation of rules or norms, we must 
distinguish, according to Kelsen, two forms of meaning: subjective and 
objective. Subjective meaning is the meaning given to an act by the subject or 
law-follower himself. Objective meaning, on the contrary, is the meaning of an 
act resulting from its interpretation in light of a legal norm. The general idea 
of Kelsen’s conception of legal interpretation is that not only law-maker and 
law-applier, but law-follower as well, is in a position to know whether his/her 
act is legal. Any reasonable individual is, therefore, capable of judging his/her 
own behaviour objectively. Objective knowledge is in Pure Theory o f Law, at 
least in principle, available to all:
»If the ’ought’ is also the objective meaning of the act, the behaviour at which 
the act is directed is regarded as something that ought to be not only from the 
point of view the individual who has performed the act, but also from the 
point of view of the individual at whose behaviour the act is directed, and of 
the third individual not involved in the relation between the two ... then the 
’ought’ as the objective meaning of an act, is a valid norm binding upon the 
addressee, that is, the individual at whom it is directed. The ought which is the 
subjective meaning of an act of will is also the objective meaning of this act, if 
this act has been invested with this meaning, if it has been authorized by a 
norm, which therefore has the character of a ’higher’ norm.«2
Kelsen’s conception of the norm is ambiguous, even controversial -  the 
evidence is this very passage -  because the norm is presented as a »schema of 
interpretation« of an act and, at the same time, as the meaning of an act of 
will. The only reasonable solution would be -  since the norm cannot be both a 
schema of interpretation and its object -  to disregard one of the two 
alternatives. It is not always clear which alternative was chosen by Kelsen 
himself. One of the reasons for this embarrassing situation is that the 
universally available objectivity of meaning is compatible only with the 
conception of norm as a schema of interpretation. But it is difficult to 
reconcile the universalisation of objective meaning with the conception of the 
norm as the »meaning of an act of will.«
This tension between two conceptions becomes even more obvious in Kelsen’s 
position on conflicting norms. The answer to this problem, as presented in his
2 . H. Kelsen, Pure Theory o f Law, 1967, p. 7f.
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first conception of norm, could be formulated as follows: If a legal system 
contains incompatible prescriptions obliging the law-follower to behave in a 
certain manner and, at the same time, not to behave in this way, then no 
objectively valid legal norm is present. The second conception is a rejection of 
this view. Two rules within the same legal system may be in conflict and, 
therefore, may place a rule-follower in a dilemma: to follow one or the other? 
But this conflict of norms is by later Kelsen no longer regarded as relevant to 
the meaning of the act as legal, because each rule, each prescription within a 
legal system is to be understood as a separate act of will. What is required, 
however, is that those acts of will should be issued by a competent authority. 
The same could be said of the objective or legal meaning of an act. The 
official, that is, legal quality of an act is determined only by the decision of a 
legal authority:
»Objective meaning is a form of institutional meaning, but it is conferred not 
in accordance with the views of the participants but according to objective 
criteria, even though these objective criteria appear, in the later Kelsen at 
least, as no more then the fact of decision by a competent legal organ. The act 
of a footballer in kicking the ball into the net may have the subjective 
meaning of a ’goal,’ in that the player understands his act as having that 
significance under the rules of the game of football. If the referee so rules, the 
act also has the objective meaning of a goal; if he whistles for off-side, the 
subjective meaning of the act does not correspond to its objective meaning.«3
In the application of legal rule by a judge, the interpretation of the rule in 
question rests on an act of will by which the judge as law-applier chooses 
between the possible interpretations of rule. It is, therefore, possible that a 
judge may choose the wrong alternative and make the wrong decision. But 
even if such a decision is considered a mistake, it is not null or invalid. Until 
this decision is annulled by a higher legal authority, it is legally valid, since it 
was made by a competent legal organ. Notwithstanding the fact that Kelsen 
regards legal errata or wrong legal decisions as legally valid as correct legal 
decisions, this does not mean that judicial decision-making is arbitrary. As 
Kelsen puts it:
»In Plato’s ideal state, in which judges may decide all cases entirely at their 
discretion, unhampered by any general norms issued by a legislator, every 
decision is, nevertheless, an application of the general norm that determines 
under what conditions an individual is authorized to act as a judge.«4
In theory, every interpretation of a statute, every application of law, is, 
according to Kelsen, legal insofar as it remains within the frame constituted by 
the statute itself. But this frame, as shown, does not preclude possible mistakes. 
Kelsen, of course, being a legal positivist, cannot concede in advance that a
3. B.S. Jackson, Op. cit., p. 238.
4. H. Kelsen, Op. tit,  p. 235.
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mistaken judicial interpretation is possible. Even more, for a legal positivist 
like Kelsen it is impossible to reconcile the idea that the statute itself renders 
the wrong decision possible.
The solution offerd by Kelsen is the following: Inasmuch as a decision is made 
by a competent legal organ whose competence was conferrerd to it by a higher 
legal authority, it should be regarded as legally valid. Even a wrong decision 
counts as valid until annulled by a higher instance as erroneous. What confers 
to a decision its validity is, therefore, not its »correctness,« but, rather, the fact 
that it was made by an official charged with the task to issue authoritative 
decisions. A mistake counts as a mistake if and only if it was declared as such 
by a competent (higher) authority. In other words, the legal meaning of 
judicial decision, whether »right« or »wrong« in itself, is determined, 
necessarily, retroactively.
We might say that in spite of Kelsen’s own intention to preserve the 
wholeness of law, a legal system as unified, his later conception of norm 
undermines his initial project. It is true that a higher norm determines a lower 
norm, that »the act by which the individual norm of judicial decision is 
created is usually predetermined ... by general norms of formal and material 
law,«5 but Kelsen, nevertheless, rejects any logical relationship of inference 
between a general norm and an individual norm. It is a mistake, according to 
the later Kelsen, to believe that the two most important logical principles, the 
law of non-contradiction and the rule of inference, are applicable to the 
relations between norms of positive law. A general or »higher« norm is not to 
be regarded as a premise having an individual norm as its conclusion. To 
illustrate Kelsen’s position, we might use his own exemple:
So far as the applicability of the logical rule of inference to legal norms is 
concerned, the question is whether, from the validity of a general norm such 
as »All thieves should be punished,« the validity of an individual norm such as 
»Smith the thief should be punished« follows logically in just the same way as 
it follows from the truth of the general statement »All men are mortal« that 
the individual statement »Socrates is mortal« is true. But there is no similar 
normative syllogism: even if the general norm holds, that »All thieves should 
be sent to prison,« it is still possible for the individual norm to hold, that 
»Smith the thief should not be sent to prison.« If a norm is conceived as a 
meaning of the act of will, then no individual norm could be implicit in the 
general norm because, as Kelsen puts it, the judge is a different man from the 
legislator and his act of will cannot be implicit in the act of will of another 
man. Whether the judge decides that Smith the thief should be sent to prison 
or not, his decision is based only on his act of will, not on the relationship of 
inference between higher and lower norm. Even if the decision made by the 
judge is in accordance with the rule of inference, this is only because the judge
5. Op. cit., p. 242.
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wanted to make it so. But Kelsen goes even further and states that, whatever 
motives the judge might have in making his decision, these motives are 
irrelevant to the legal status of his decision.
Notwithstanding the fact that this view of the later Kelsen concerning norms is 
hardly acceptable even to his followers, it is a logical consequence of his 
positivist position. But there still remains to be explained how to preserve the 
objective validity of judicial decisions. In the absence of the normative 
syllogism, which means that the legal validity of judicial decisions can not be 
guaranteed in advance by any logical relationship between norms, the only 
answer seems to be that legal validity is presupposed. In this sense we could say 
that whatever a judge decides, it should be regarded as legally valid because 
the decision was issued by a competent legal organ. What guarantees the legal 
validity of the legal application is only the authoritative status of the 
law-applier.
* *
For Hart, to solve the problem of judicial interpretation is to find the middle 
way between »formalism« and the »skepticism« or »realism.« The stability and 
order, necessary for legal interpretation are guaranteed by the »core of the 
settled meaning« of general expressions. On the other hand, »penumbra of 
uncertainty« saves the legal interpretation from the dangers of formalism. But 
Hart’s distinction between central clarity (a core of the fixed meaning) and 
peripheral shadow (a margin of uncertain meaning that is yet to be 
determined) implies more than a conventional theory of language. As to the 
question of why is it necessary to presuppose a »core of settled meaning« at all, 
Hart’s position is clear and firm:
»If it were not possible to communicate general standards of conduct, which 
multitudes of individuals could understand, without further direction, as 
requiring from them certain conduct when occasion arose, nothing that we 
now recognize as law could exist«0.
And even more explicitly:
»If we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most 
elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that certain type of 
behaviour be regulated by rules, then the general words we use... must have 
some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about their application. 
There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a 
penumbra of debatable cases in in which words are neither obviously 
applicable nor obviously ruled out.«7
We could summarize Hart’s answer to this question as follows: the 
presupposition of a »core of settled meaning« is necessary because the
6. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f Law, Oxford 1961, p. 121.
7. Ibid.
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existence of law as an institution of social regulation depends upon it. But even 
though his theory of judicial interpretation is based on distinction between 
paradigm-cases or clear-cases and difficult cases, Hart is nevertheless forced to 
admit that there is no answer or, at least, no unproblematic answer to the 
question »what makes a ’clear case’ clear or makes a general rule obviously 
and uniquely applicable to a particular case.«
In The Concept o f Law, Hart presents the question of legal interpretation not 
as a question of »what is the meaning of expression X« but, rather, as a quest­
ion of »does/ought expression X apply to situation Y?« And it is in the context 
of this reformulation that we must situate Hart’s distinction between »plain 
cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general expressions are 
clearly applicable«8 and difficult cases, possesing only some of the features of 
plain cases but lacking others. Hart describes these debatable cases as follows:
»There are reasons both for and against our use of a general term, and no firm 
convention or general agreement dictates its use, or, on the other hand, its 
rejection by the person concerned to classify. If in such cases doubts are to be 
resolved, something in the nature of a choice between open alternatives must 
be made by whoever is to resolve them.«9
The significance of this reformulation of the question of legal interpretation is 
not only that we do not know in advance whether concept X applies to 
situation Y, but also that it is the interpretation itself that decides whether 
concept X should or should not apply to situation Y.
The gist of this distinction between clear and penumbral cases is not that the 
clear cases are unproblematic and need no interpretation because they are 
characterized by a »core of undisputed meaning« but, rather, that they are 
recognized as unproblematic because the meaning of the general expressions 
applied in them has not been disputed. The same could be said of the 
applicability of legal rules to concrete cases. As Hart puts it:
»Legal rules may have a central core of undisputed meaning, and in some cases 
it may be difficult to imagine a dispute as to the meaning of a rule breaking 
out. ... Yet all rules have a penumbra of uncertainty where the judge must 
choose between alternatives. Even the meaning of the innocent-seeming 
provision of the Wills Act that the testator must sign the will may prove 
doubtful in certain circumstances.«10
We could say that, according to Hart, for all rules some unforseen 
circumstances may arise that could render their application questionable. In 
other words, though the distinction between easy cases and hard cases is useful 
and perhaps even necessary for judicial interpretation, it is impossible to 
decide in advance which case is easy and which is difficult.
8. Op. t i t ,  p. 123.
9. Ibid.
10. Op. ti t ,  p. 12.
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But how, then, is the judge in the position to know if a certain general rule 
applies to particular cases in the absence of a positive standard or criterion for 
his/her interpretation? Hart’s answer to this question is phrased almost in 
Wittgensteinian manner: Even if canons of interpretation existed, they could 
not eliminate the uncertainty of interpretation since they would be themselves 
rules and would, therefore, require their own interpretation.
In fact, the discretion left to the judge by language itself is very wide. 
Whenever the judge applies the rule to a particular case, notwithstanding the 
fact that his/her application may be correct, wrong or even arbitrary, his/her 
interpretation of the rule in question is a result of a decision, of a choice 
among possible alternatives. The reason that makes such choice necessary is 
that which Hart labeled »open texture« of all rules and standards. At some 
point of legal practice, all legal rules prove to be ultimately indeterminate and 
their application uncertain because they use expressions of a natural language 
which is, by hypothesis, irreducibly open textured.
Judicial discretion is, then, founded in the nature of the interpretation itself, in 
its ultimate uncertainty. Of course, it would be inacceptable, at least for Hart, 
to imply that judicial interpretation is in essence arbitrary. On the contrary, 
rather than arbitrariness, open texture of legal rules implies judicial 
responsibility. It is clear that the ordinary meaning of general terms could not 
be taken for granted, since the ordinary meaning as warranted by everyday 
usage is often burdened with ideological implications. But on the other hand, if 
the judge decides to take the ordinary meaning for granted, he is nevertheless 
responsible for that decision. We could say that, despite the fact that our 
everyday legal experience may present different evidence, there is, in 
principle, no »automatic« application of legal rules to particular cases and, 
therefore, no alibi for judicial decisions.
* * *
Amongst contemporary legal philosophers, R. Dworkin has dealt most 
explicitly with the questions relating to the function of judge and, 
consequently, developed in detail a theory of adjudication, a theory conceived 
to be both a description of how a judge in fact interprets a given legal doctrine 
and how s/he should interpret it if his/her interpretation is to be valid or -  to 
put it in terms of Dworkin’s philosophy -  the right one and if the »rightness« 
of his/hers interpretation is to be guaranteed.
One of the slogans of Dworkin’s theory of adjudication is that there is always a 
right answer to a question of law and, therefore, always a right, unique 
solution to all cases, even the most difficult. It is clear that this position is in 
conflict with the positivist conception of law. Dworkin criticizes two tenets of 
positivist theory: the positivist doctrine conceiving the law as a system consist­
ing only of rules, and the doctrine of judicial discretion saying that in the 
absence of a clear rule judges have discretionary power to create a new rule.
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Dworkin rejects the positivist approach and its methodological principles, 
above all, the separation of law and morals. Dworkin argues that the ultimate 
foundation of law is not a rule of recognition or a Kelsenian basic rule, but a 
set of legal principles. Legal rules can be morally unjust -  this is especially 
evident in the case of Nazi law -  but they are, nevertheless, in their essence, 
based on moral principles. This does not mean that legal principles are »moral­
ly correct principles« or that law is always morally right. Legal principles are 
not fashioned in accordance with a given positive morality. They may be 
morally disputable, but with regard to their form they are necessarily moral.
If a positivist picture of law is a hierarchical system of rules, Dworkin offers a 
pluralistic picture of dispersed principles, linked together in a loose web rather 
than in structure. It would, therefore, be absurd to seek to discover their 
origin, to locate their utterer:
»We make a case for a principle, for its weight, by appealing to an amalgam of 
practices and other principles in which the implications of legislative and 
judicial history figure along with appeals to community practices and 
understandings’.11
Contrary to hierarchically organized legal rules or legal norms, »a principle is a 
principle of law if it figures in the soundest theory of law that can be provided 
as a justification for the explicit and substantive rules of the jurisdiction in 
question.«12
As a consequence of this modern, though not modernist, picture of law, 
Dworkin refuses to establish a typically positivist distinction between legal 
theory and legal practice. For him, legal theory is in its essence (interpretative) 
practice, on the other hand, legal practice is already in itself a theory of inter­
pretation. Dworkin describes a judge as a Hercules who is capable of finding a 
solution for every case by being a philosopher and a practitioner at the same 
time. As a philosopher he builds a theory as a means to justify his decisions as 
judge, as a law-applier he verifies a theory that he himself has developed 
before. The weakness of this theory of adjudication is clearly in its circularity:
»If jurisprudence is to form principles capable of justifying practices and rules, 
what are the practices and rules that have to be justified?«13
What is needed to identify principles as foundation of legal practice and theory 
is a construction, a creative interpretation rather than a discovery. We might 
say that in theory it goes smoothly, but in practice Dworkin faces again the 
circularity:
»Since there are no permanent criteria enabling the scholar to identify them, 
he is forced to look among the principles elaborated from the rules for the
11. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London 1977, p. 18.
12. Op. ti t ,  p. 36.
13. M. Troper, »Judges Taken to Seriously: Professor Dworkin’s views on Jurisprudence,« Ratio 
Juris, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1988, p. 168.
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criteria that will serve to select those rules, which will in turn serve to 
elaborate the principles, etc.«14
Despite the fact that Dworkin describes practicing law and theorizing about it 
as a creative activity, he nevertheless criticizes positivists for stating -  as 
shown on Kelsen’s and Hart’s example -  that judges actually create new rules, 
in short, that judges make law. In Dworkin’s theory of judicial 
decision-making, the judge can never make law, he is never in the position of 
legislator, autonomous in relation to legal discourse. If for positivists, 
especially for Kelsen, unity of law is not given in advance but, rather, 
constituted only retroactively by an act of will of legal authority, for Dworkin 
the legal universe is always already coherent, consistent, whole. The position 
of the judge changes radically:
»Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case before him, as a 
partner in a complex chain enterprise of which innumerable decisions, 
structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his job to continue 
that history into the future through what he does on the day. He must 
interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the 
enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own.«15
Creativity of interpretation is not in itself an end but it serves a higher end 
that is to »advance the enterprise hand,« as Dworkin puts it. The very essence 
of Dworkin’s interpretative activity is to preserve the continuity of the 
enterprise. Even more, judicial interpretation can never be really innovative, 
creative since beliefs of a judge -  as a precondition of his interpretation -  are 
already shaped by the legal enterprise itself. Judicial interpretations may 
differ, they may even be controversial but this controversy does not testify 
against the unity of law, since all interpretation must be regarded as links of 
the same chain, as elements of the same narrative tradition.
Where legal positivists, especially Kelsen and Hart, insist on judicial 
responsibility in the process of decision-making, the obligation of Dworkin’s 
judge is only to follow instructions arising from the legal enterprise itself. He is 
not responsible for his interpretation, since his interpretation is already 
predetermined by legal tradition. In so far we may agree with M. Troper,16 
who claims that Dworkin’s theory of adjudication provides an ideological 
justification for ideological judicial practice. Dworkin, by merely denying the 
existence of the judicial discretion, only repeats what judges themselves say 
that they are merely applying the legislator’s intentions or, as in Dworkin’s 
case, fundamental principles embedded in the legal enterprise.
14. Ibid.
15. R. Dworkin, A  M atter o f Principle, London 1985, p.159.
16. M. Troper, Op. tit, p. 174.
